Arbeitspapier
Forecasts as Repeated Cheap Talk from an Expert of Unknown Statistical Bias
For two periods an expert E announces his forecast of the state to a decision-maker D who chooses action. They disagree about the precision of the probability assessments. At the end of period 1 the state is observed. In the last period E makes announcements more extreme than his forecasts. Despite countable equilibria, full revelation is never realised. When in period 1 E is interested in reputation only, the initial equilibrium partition is finite; E makes announcements of greater uncertainty with respect to his forecasts. When E is interested in action too, reputational concerns mitigate exaggerated reports.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 020.2023
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Expectations; Speculations
- Subject
-
cheap-talk
expert
statistical bias
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Valsecchi, Irene
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
-
Milano
- (when)
-
2023
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Valsecchi, Irene
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2023
Other Objects (12)
Repeated cheap-talk games of common interest between a decision-maker and an expert of unknown statistical bias
Interpretation of point forecasts with unknown directive
Interpretation of point forecasts with unknown directive
Combination of biased forecasts: Bias correction or bias based weights?
Combination of biased forecasts: Bias correction or bias based weights?
Forecaster Behaviour and Bias in Macroeconomic Forecasts
CHEAP
Cheap!
Augmenting short Cheap Talk scripts with a repeated Opt-Out Reminder in Choice Experiment surveys
Cheap book
Going cheap
Sold-cheap
Repeated cheap-talk games of common interest between a decision-maker and an expert of unknown statistical bias
Interpretation of point forecasts with unknown directive
Interpretation of point forecasts with unknown directive
Combination of biased forecasts: Bias correction or bias based weights?
Combination of biased forecasts: Bias correction or bias based weights?
Forecaster Behaviour and Bias in Macroeconomic Forecasts
CHEAP
Cheap!
Augmenting short Cheap Talk scripts with a repeated Opt-Out Reminder in Choice Experiment surveys
Cheap book
Going cheap
Sold-cheap
Repeated cheap-talk games of common interest between a decision-maker and an expert of unknown statistical bias
Interpretation of point forecasts with unknown directive
Interpretation of point forecasts with unknown directive
Combination of biased forecasts: Bias correction or bias based weights?
Combination of biased forecasts: Bias correction or bias based weights?
Forecaster Behaviour and Bias in Macroeconomic Forecasts
CHEAP
Cheap!
Augmenting short Cheap Talk scripts with a repeated Opt-Out Reminder in Choice Experiment surveys
Cheap book
Going cheap