The volunteer’s dilemma in finite populations

Artikel

We study the long-run stochastic stability properties of volunteering strategies in finite populations. We allow for mixed strategies, characterized by the probability that a player may not volunteer. A pairwise comparison of evolutionary strategies shows that the strategy with a lower probability of volunteering is advantaged. However, in the long run there are also populations of volunteering types. Monomorphisms with the more volunteering types are more frequent if the populations have fewer members, and if the benefits from volunteering are larger. Such monomorphisms with volunteering cease to exist if the population becomes infinitely large. In contrast, the disadvantage of volunteering disappears if the ratio of individual benefits and costs of volunteering becomes infinitely large.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Journal of Evolutionary Economics ; ISSN: 1432-1386 ; Volume: 31 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1277-1290 ; Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Externalities ; Public Goods
• Subject: Volunteering ; Stochastic stability ; Finite populations ; Mixed strategies

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Konrad, Kai A. ; Morath, Florian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Springer
• (where): Berlin, Heidelberg
• (when): 2021

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.1007/s00191-020-00719-y
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET