The volunteer’s dilemma in finite populations

Artikel

We study the long-run stochastic stability properties of volunteering strategies in finite populations. We allow for mixed strategies, characterized by the probability that a player may not volunteer. A pairwise comparison of evolutionary strategies shows that the strategy with a lower probability of volunteering is advantaged. However, in the long run there are also populations of volunteering types. Monomorphisms with the more volunteering types are more frequent if the populations have fewer members, and if the benefits from volunteering are larger. Such monomorphisms with volunteering cease to exist if the population becomes infinitely large. In contrast, the disadvantage of volunteering disappears if the ratio of individual benefits and costs of volunteering becomes infinitely large.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Journal of Evolutionary Economics ; ISSN: 1432-1386 ; Volume: 31 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1277-1290 ; Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Externalities ; Public Goods
• Thema: Volunteering ; Stochastic stability ; Finite populations ; Mixed strategies

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Konrad, Kai A. ; Morath, Florian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Springer
• (wo): Berlin, Heidelberg
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.1007/s00191-020-00719-y
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ