Arbeitspapier

Price discrimination and salience-driven consumer preferences

This paper generalizes the price discrimination framework of Mussa and Rosen (1978) by considering salience-driven consumer preferences in the sense of Bordalo et al. (2013b). Consumers with salience-driven preferences give a higher weight to attributes that vary more. This reduces the monopolist's propensity to treat different types of consumers differently. The paper's main result characterizes the conditions under which the monopolist induces consumers to focus on price rather than on quality.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 19-06

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Consumer Economics: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Thema
Salience
price discrimination
monopolist

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Adrian, Nana
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bern, Department of Economics
(wo)
Bern
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Adrian, Nana
  • University of Bern, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2019

Ähnliche Objekte (12)