Arbeitspapier

The Pre-commitment Advantage of Having a Slow Legislative System

In this paper it is argued that the slowness of the legislativesystem implies pre-commitment of legislation for at least the periodit takes to change a law. A simple model illustrates the benefit ofthis pre-commitment.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 01-008/3

Classification
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Open Economy Macroeconomics
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Subject
time-inconsistency
legislation
irreversible investments
Demokratie
Gesetzgebung
Zeitökonomie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Frijters, Paul
Tieman, Alexander F.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Frijters, Paul
  • Tieman, Alexander F.
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2001

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