Arbeitspapier
The Pre-commitment Advantage of Having a Slow Legislative System
In this paper it is argued that the slowness of the legislativesystem implies pre-commitment of legislation for at least the periodit takes to change a law. A simple model illustrates the benefit ofthis pre-commitment.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 01-008/3
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Open Economy Macroeconomics
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
- Subject
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time-inconsistency
legislation
irreversible investments
Demokratie
Gesetzgebung
Zeitökonomie
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Frijters, Paul
Tieman, Alexander F.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Frijters, Paul
- Tieman, Alexander F.
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2001