Artikel
Voluntary versus enforced team effort
We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of laboratory experiments. This allows for high cooperation payoffs but also provides individual free-riding incentives. Due to significant cooperation, we observe that, in team remuneration, participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that, when participants are not given the option of private remuneration, they cooperate significantly less.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 277-301 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: General
Public Goods
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Subject
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team effort
voluntary collaboration
experimental economics
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Keser, Claudia
Montmarquette, Claude
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2011
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g2030277
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Keser, Claudia
- Montmarquette, Claude
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2011
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