Arbeitspapier
An incentive theory of matching
This paper presents a theory explaining the labor market matching process through microeconomic incentives. There are heterogeneous variations in the characteristics of workers and jobs, and firms face adjustment costs in responding to these variations. Matches and separations are described through firms' job offer and firing decisions and workers' job acceptance and quit decisions. This approach obviates the need for a matching function. On this theoretical basis, we argue that the matching function is vulnerable to the Lucas critique. Our calibrated model for the U.S. economy can account for important empirical regularities that the conventional matching model cannot.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1512
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
incentives
adjustment costs
unemployment
employment
quits
firing
job offers
job acceptance
Arbeitsmarkttheorie
Arbeitsangebot
Arbeitsnachfrage
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Matching
Lucas-Modell
Theorie
USA
Merkl, Christian
Snower, Dennis J.
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Brown, Alessio J. G.
- Merkl, Christian
- Snower, Dennis J.
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Entstanden
- 2009