Arbeitspapier
Signaling with private monitoring
We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A forward-looking sender signals her type continuously over time to a myopic receiver who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the receiver transmits his private inferences back through an imperfect public signal of his actions. Preferences are linear-quadratic and the information structure is Gaussian. We construct linear Markov equilibria using belief states up to the sender's second-order belief. Because of the private monitoring, this state is an explicit function of the sender's past play, leading to a novel separation effect through the second-order belief channel. Applications to models of organizations and reputation are examined.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Staff Report ; No. 994
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
signaling
private monitoring
continuous time
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cisternas, Gonzalo
Kolb, Aaron
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
- (wo)
-
New York, NY
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cisternas, Gonzalo
- Kolb, Aaron
- Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Entstanden
- 2021