Arbeitspapier

Signaling with private monitoring

We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A forward-looking sender signals her type continuously over time to a myopic receiver who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the receiver transmits his private inferences back through an imperfect public signal of his actions. Preferences are linear-quadratic and the information structure is Gaussian. We construct linear Markov equilibria using belief states up to the sender's second-order belief. Because of the private monitoring, this state is an explicit function of the sender's past play, leading to a novel separation effect through the second-order belief channel. Applications to models of organizations and reputation are examined.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Staff Report ; No. 994

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
signaling
private monitoring
continuous time

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cisternas, Gonzalo
Kolb, Aaron
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cisternas, Gonzalo
  • Kolb, Aaron
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Entstanden

  • 2021

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