Arbeitspapier
Understanding the Development of Fundamentalism
We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects. Leaders work to enhance their followers? observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable conditions, rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more extreme.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1227
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Cultural Economics: Religion
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Subject
-
fundamentalism
rent-seeking
religion
Radikalismus
Rent Seeking
Religion
Wettbewerb
Politische Gewalt
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gang, Ira N.
Epstein, Gil S.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gang, Ira N.
- Epstein, Gil S.
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2004
Other Objects (12)
Understanding the development of fundamentalism
Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making
The political economy of Kosher Wars
Decentralizing aid with interested parties
Rent seeking in hierachical firms
Migration and Culture
Contests, NGOs and decentralizing aid
Ethnicity, assimilation and harassment in the labor market
Inequality, good governance and endemic corruption
Why pay taxes when no one else does?
Poverty and governance: The contest for aid
Government and cities: Contests and the decentralization of decision making
Understanding the development of fundamentalism
Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making
The political economy of Kosher Wars
Decentralizing aid with interested parties
Rent seeking in hierachical firms
Migration and Culture
Contests, NGOs and decentralizing aid
Ethnicity, assimilation and harassment in the labor market
Inequality, good governance and endemic corruption
Why pay taxes when no one else does?
Poverty and governance: The contest for aid
Government and cities: Contests and the decentralization of decision making
Understanding the development of fundamentalism
Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making
The political economy of Kosher Wars
Decentralizing aid with interested parties
Rent seeking in hierachical firms
Migration and Culture
Contests, NGOs and decentralizing aid
Ethnicity, assimilation and harassment in the labor market
Inequality, good governance and endemic corruption
Why pay taxes when no one else does?
Poverty and governance: The contest for aid