Arbeitspapier

Commodity Taxes, Wage Determination and Profits

We examine the effects of two different types of commodity taxation, specific and ad valorem, on wages and profits. We analyze two models of wage determination, one with efficiency wage setting and one with bargaining between a union and a firm. In the former, a (locally) revenue-neutral shift from specific to ad valorem taxation leads to an increase in both employment and wages, and a reduction in profitability. In the bargaining case however, the effect on wages and profits may be reversed: predominantly ad valorem taxation raises employment but lowers wages, and under certain circumstances, the net effect can lead to an increase in profits.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Department of Economics Discussion Paper ; No. 9816

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm
Labor Contracts
Thema
Commodity taxation
specific tax
ad valorem tax
efficiency wage
bargaining
Verbrauchsteuer
Spezielle Verbrauchsteuer
Effizienzlohn
Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Delipalla, Sophia
Sanfey, Peter
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Kent, Department of Economics
(wo)
Canterbury
(wann)
1998

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Delipalla, Sophia
  • Sanfey, Peter
  • University of Kent, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1998

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