Policy-motivated candidates, noisy platforms, and non-robustness

Abstract: "A model of a two-candidate election is developed in which the candidates are mainly office-motivated but also to some arbitrarily small extent policy-motivated, and their chosen platforms are to some arbitrarily small extent noisy. The platforms' being noisy means that if a candidate has chosen a particular platform, the voters' perception is that she has, with positive probability, actually chosen some other platform. It is shown that (1) an equilibrium in which the candidates play pure exists whether or not there is a Condorcet winner among the policy alternatives, and (2) in this equilibrium the candidates choose their ideal points, which means that the platforms do not converge." (author's abstract)

Alternative title
Politikmotivierte Kandidaten, Plattformen mit Rauschen und Nichtrobustheit
Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource, 28 S.
Language
Englisch
Notes
Veröffentlichungsversion

Bibliographic citation
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 00-17

Classification
Politik
Keyword
Spieltheorie
Noise trading
Arrow-Paradoxon
Theorie
Wahlkampf
Räumliche Konkurrenz

Event
Veröffentlichung
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2000
Creator
Contributor
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-116248
Rights
Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
25.03.2025, 1:54 PM CET

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Associated

Time of origin

  • 2000

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