Arbeitspapier

Policy-motivated candidates, noisy platforms, and non-robustness

A model of a two-candidate election is developed in which the candidates are mainly office-motivated but also to some arbitrarily small extent policy-motivated, and their chosen platforms are to some arbitrarily small extent noisy. The platforms’ being noisy means that if a candidate has chosen a particular platform, the voters’ perception is that she has, with positive probability, actually chosen some other platform. It is shown that (i) an equilibrium in which the candidates play pure exists whether or not there is a Condorcet winner among the policy alternatives, and (ii) in this equilibrium the candidates choose their ideal points, which means that the platforms do not converge.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 00-17

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Electoral competition
Policy motivation
Noisy commitment
Convergence
Robustness

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lagerlöf, Johan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lagerlöf, Johan
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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