Arbeitspapier

More than words: Communication in intergroup conflicts

Numerous studies suggest that communication may be a universal means to mitigate collective action problems. In this study, we challenge this view and show that the communication structure crucially determines whether communication mitigates or intensifies the problem of collective action. We observe the effect of different communication structures on collective action in the context of finitely repeated intergroup conflict and demonstrate that conflict expenditures are significantly higher if communication is restricted to one's own group as compared to a situation with no communication. However, expenditures are significantly lower if open communication within one's own group and between rivaling groups is allowed. We show that under open communication intergroup conflicts are avoided by groups taking turns in winning the contest. Our results do not only qualify the role of communication for collective action but may also provide insights on how to mitigate the destructive nature of intergroup conflicts.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2010,065

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Thema
communication
conflict
experiment
rent-seeking
Kommunikation
Konflikt
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Rent Seeking
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Leibbrandt, Andreas
Sääksvuori, Lauri
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(wo)
Jena
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Leibbrandt, Andreas
  • Sääksvuori, Lauri
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2010

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