The Inefficiency of Market Transparency - A Model with Endogenous Entry

Konferenzbeitrag

Including the entry decision in a Bertrand model with imperfectly informed consumers, we introduce a trade-off at the level of social welfare. On the one hand, market transparency is beneficial when the number of firms is exogenously given. On the other, a higher degree of market transparency implies lower profits and hence makes it less attractive to enter the market in the first place. It turns out that the second effect dominates: too much market transparency has a detrimental effect on consumer surplus and on social welfare.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Oligopolistic Competition and Network Formation ; No. F9-V2

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
• Thema: Market transparency ; Endogenous entry ; Homogenous products

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gu, Yiquan ; Hehenkamp, Burkhard
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Verein für Socialpolitik
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37416
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ