Arbeitspapier
One Country, One Vote? Labor Market Structure and Voting Rights in the ECB
The pending enlargement of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has brought to the fore the discussion of the voting right distribution in the European Central Bank (ECB) council. We show that, in a model where labor unions internalize the inflationary consequences of wage setting, deviating from a voting scheme based purely on economic size can be beneficial. Preliminary evidence on unemployment and voting rights in the ECB council seems broadly in line with this idea. We also point to possible policy implications for EMU enlargement and ECB restructuring.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1165
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
monetary policy
wage setting
European Monetary Union
European Central Bank
euro area
ECB reform
EMU enlargement
accession countries
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Berger, Helge
Hefeker, Carsten
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Berger, Helge
- Hefeker, Carsten
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2004
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