Arbeitspapier
On the emergence of social conformity
We consider a dynamic model of conformity that permits both a conformist and non-conformist equilibrium. We provide conditions under which conformity can 'invade' a population. More precisely, starting from a non-conformist equilibrium, we show that the conformity of an arbitrarily small proportion of the population can lead to the spread of conformism and the ultimate emergence of the conformist equilibrium. This occurs independently of whether or not the non-conformist equilibrium Pareto dominates the conformist equilibrium.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Department of Economics Discussion Paper ; No. 05,01
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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Conformity
best reply
coordination
norm
Dynamisches Modell
Soziale Norm
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Cartwright, Edward
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Kent, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Canterbury
- (when)
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2005
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cartwright, Edward
- University of Kent, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2005