Arbeitspapier

On the emergence of social conformity

We consider a dynamic model of conformity that permits both a conformist and non-conformist equilibrium. We provide conditions under which conformity can 'invade' a population. More precisely, starting from a non-conformist equilibrium, we show that the conformity of an arbitrarily small proportion of the population can lead to the spread of conformism and the ultimate emergence of the conformist equilibrium. This occurs independently of whether or not the non-conformist equilibrium Pareto dominates the conformist equilibrium.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Department of Economics Discussion Paper ; No. 05,01

Classification
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Noncooperative Games
Subject
Conformity
best reply
coordination
norm
Dynamisches Modell
Soziale Norm

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cartwright, Edward
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Kent, Department of Economics
(where)
Canterbury
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cartwright, Edward
  • University of Kent, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2005

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