Arbeitspapier
Credence goods markets, distributional preferences and the role of institutions
We study credence goods markets where an expert not only cares for her own monetary payoff, but also for the monetary payoff of her customer. We show how an expert with heterogeneous distributional preferences responds to monetary incentives in the absence of institutions, under liability and/or verifiability and identify optimal contracts for an expert with distributional preferences in each of these settings.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2012-11
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
other-regarding preferences
credence good
institution
contract theory
industrial organization
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Erharter, Dominik
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
- (wo)
-
Innsbruck
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Erharter, Dominik
- University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
Entstanden
- 2012
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