Arbeitspapier

Do Politicians Reward Core Supporters? Evidence from a Discretionary Grant Program

We investigate whether politicians award intergovernmental grants to core supporters. Our new dataset contains information on discretionary project grants from a German state government to municipalities over the period 2008-2011. The results show that discretionary grants were awarded to municipalities with many core supporters of the incumbent state government. Discretionary grants per capita increased by about 1.4 percent when the vote share of the incumbent party in the state election increased by one percentage point. The fiscal capacity of a municipality does, by contrast, not predict the level of discretionary grants. We propose to trim discretionary project grants to the benefit of formula-based grants.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6097

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
Subject
intergovernmental grants
discretionary grants
fiscal equalization
core supporters
electoral motives

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kauder, Björn
Potrafke, Niklas
Reischmann, Markus
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kauder, Björn
  • Potrafke, Niklas
  • Reischmann, Markus
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2016

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