Arbeitspapier

Do Politicians Reward Core Supporters? Evidence from a Discretionary Grant Program

We investigate whether politicians award intergovernmental grants to core supporters. Our new dataset contains information on discretionary project grants from a German state government to municipalities over the period 2008-2011. The results show that discretionary grants were awarded to municipalities with many core supporters of the incumbent state government. Discretionary grants per capita increased by about 1.4 percent when the vote share of the incumbent party in the state election increased by one percentage point. The fiscal capacity of a municipality does, by contrast, not predict the level of discretionary grants. We propose to trim discretionary project grants to the benefit of formula-based grants.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6097

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
Thema
intergovernmental grants
discretionary grants
fiscal equalization
core supporters
electoral motives

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kauder, Björn
Potrafke, Niklas
Reischmann, Markus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kauder, Björn
  • Potrafke, Niklas
  • Reischmann, Markus
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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