Arbeitspapier
Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence
This paper experimentally analyzes the cartel coordination challenge induced by the discrimination of cartel ringleaders in leniency policies. Ringleaders often take a leading role in the coordination and formation of a cartel. A leniency policy which grants amnesty to all whistleblowers except for ringleaders may therefore reduce the incentive to become a ringleader and may disrupt cartel formation. We analyze discriminatory and non-discriminatory leniency policies in a multi-stage cartel formation experiment where multiple ringleaders may emerge. Although theory predicts that cartels will always be reported, whistleblowing rarely occurs. Paradoxically the discriminatory leniency policy induces more firms to become ringleaders, which ultimately facilitates coordination in the cartel.
- ISBN
-
978-3-86304-129-8
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 130
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Antitrust Law
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
Cartels
Leniency Programs
Ringleader Discrimination
Experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Clemens, Georg
Rau, Holger A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wo)
-
Düsseldorf
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Clemens, Georg
- Rau, Holger A.
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2014
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