Arbeitspapier

Uncertainty about perceived inflation target and monetary policy

We analyse the interaction between private agents? uncertainty about inflation target and the central bank's data uncertainty. In our model, private agents update their perceived inflation target and the central bank estimates unobservable economic shocks as well as the perceived inflation target. Under those two uncertainties, the learning process of both private agents and the central bank causes higher order beliefs to become relevant, and this mechanism is capable of generating high persistence and volatility of inflation even though the underlying shocks are purely transitory. We also find that the persistence and volatility become smaller as the inflation target becomes more credible, that is, the private agents' uncertainty about inflation target (and hence the bank's data uncertainty) diminishes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper Series 1 ; No. 2007,18

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Central Banks and Their Policies
Monetary Policy
Thema
Monetary policy
central banks
Inflation Targeting
Glaubwürdigkeit
Risiko
Inflationserwartung
Geldpolitik
Inflation
Volatilität
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Aoki, Kosuke
Kimura, Takeshi
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsche Bundesbank
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Aoki, Kosuke
  • Kimura, Takeshi
  • Deutsche Bundesbank

Entstanden

  • 2007

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