Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model

Abstract: We model a game involving a terrorist, the terrorist’s benefactor, and a government protecting against terrorism. The terrorist generates terrorism effort using its own resources, funding from a benefactor, and crime. Crime can be lucrative for a terrorist but may deter benefactors, thus causing a strategic dilemma. The model accounts for resources, costs of effort, valuations of terrorism by the three players, and crime production characteristics. We determine how a variety of model parameters, the government, and the benefactor influence a terrorist’s terrorism and crime efforts, and relative ideological orientation along a continuum from ideological to criminal. We determine which factors impact government protection, for example that it is inverse U shaped in terrorism effort. We determine the implications of letting the benefactor choose optimal funding and/or punishment for crime, for example eliminating punishment if both are chosen optimally. The model parameters are es.... https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/3091

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model ; volume:11 ; day:21 ; month:12 ; year:2017 ; International journal of conflict and violence ; 11 (21.12.2017)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Kjell Hausken

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.4119/ijcv-3091
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020062211082358852411
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 14.08.2025, 10:52 MESZ