Artikel

Opacity, liquidity and disclosure requirements

We present a model that links the opacity of an asset to its liquidity. We show that while low‐opacity assets are liquid, intermediate levels of opacity provide incentives for investors to acquire private information, causing adverse selection and illiquidity. High opacity, however, benefits liquidity by reducing the value of a unit of private information. The cross‐section of bid–ask spreads of US firms is shown to be broadly consistent with this hump‐shaped relationship between opacity and illiquidity. Our analysis suggests that uniform disclosure standards may be suboptimal; efficient disclosure can instead be achieved through a two‐tier standard system or by subsidizing voluntary disclosure.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting ; ISSN: 1468-5957 ; Volume: 49 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 5-6 ; Pages: 658-689 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Klassifikation
Management
Thema
asymmetric information
disclosure requirements
liquidity
opacity

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Stenzel, André
Wagner, Wolf
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wiley
(wo)
Hoboken, NJ
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.1111/jbfa.12574
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Stenzel, André
  • Wagner, Wolf
  • Wiley

Entstanden

  • 2021

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