Arbeitspapier

Climate change: Behavioral responses from extreme events and delayed damages

Understanding how to sustain cooperation in the climate change global dilemma is crucial to mitigate its harmful consequences. Damages from climate change typically occurs after long delays and can take the form of more frequent realizations of extreme and random events. These features generate a decoupling between emis- sions and their damages, which we study through a laboratory experiment. We find that some decision-makers respond to global emissions, as expected, while others respond to realized damages also when emissions are observable. On balance, the presence of delayed/stochastic consequences did not impair cooperation. However, we observed a worrisome increasing trend of emissions when damages hit with delay.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 2002

Classification
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Design of Experiments: General
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Subject
Social dilemma
Experiments
Greenhouse gas
Pollution

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ghidoni, Riccardo
Calzolari, Giacomo
Casari, Marco
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2017

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5548
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ghidoni, Riccardo
  • Calzolari, Giacomo
  • Casari, Marco
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2017

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