Arbeitspapier

Hayek and Schmitt on the "depoliticization" of the economy

Both Friedrich Hayek and Carl Schmitt are critical of the role of economic interest groups in modern democracies. This paper begins by comparing their descriptions of how such groups attempt to obtain favorable treatment from the state ('rent seeking'). The paper then discusses the proposed solutions. Schmitt's solution, called depoliticization, involves the establishment of an authoritarian state with a corporatist economic system. Hayek, by contrast, argues in favor of limiting the ability of politicians to grant privileges to economic groups. The paper finally asks whether, as claimed in the literature, Hayek's solution is similar to Schmitt's in that both attempt to shield the free market economy from democratic oversight. It is argued that Hayek's solution is not undemocratic (unless one defines democracy as pure majoritarianism), while Schmitt's solution is not conducive to free markets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CHOPE Working Paper ; No. 2022-15

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Nientiedt, Daniel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Duke University, Center for the History of Political Economy (CHOPE)
(wo)
Durham, NC
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.2139/ssrn.4314135
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Nientiedt, Daniel
  • Duke University, Center for the History of Political Economy (CHOPE)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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