Favoritism by the governing elite

Arbeitspapier

In this paper, we study the extent to which ministers engage in regional favoritism. We are the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of a larger set of the governing elite, not just focusing on the primary leader. We manually collect birthplaces of this governing elite globally. Combining this information with extended nighttime luminosity and novel population data over the period from 1992 to 2016, we utilize a staggered difference-in-differences estimator and find that birthplaces of ministers globally emit on average roughly 9 % more nightlight. This result is predominantly attributable to the African sub-sample. We find no evidence that the measured effect is driven by, or induces, migration to the home regions of ministers. The size of our data set lets us investigate heterogeneities along a number of dimensions: political power, ministerial portfolio, and the institutional setting.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-96973-198-7
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 1029

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; State and Local Budget and Expenditures ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes
• Subject: Favoritism ; elite capture ; spatiality ; luminosity ; population ; democracy

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Asatryan, Zareh ; Baskaran, Thushyanthan ; Birkholz, Carlo ; Hufschmidt, Patrick
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
• (where): Essen
• (when): 2023

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.4419/96973198
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/273552
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET