Arbeitspapier
Governing collective action in the face of observational error
We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported incorrectly) affecting either one or both sanctioning environments. We find that the institution with more accurate information is always by far the most popular, but noisy information undermines the popularity of peer-to-peer sanctions more strongly than that of centralized sanctions. This may contribute to explaining the greater reliance on centralized sanctioning institutions in complex environments.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2017-2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- Thema
-
Public goods
sanctions
information
institution
voting
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Markussen, Thomas
Putterman, Louis G.
Wang, Liangjun
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Brown University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Providence, RI
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Markussen, Thomas
- Putterman, Louis G.
- Wang, Liangjun
- Brown University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2017
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