Financial Markets and Dissent in the ECB's Governing Council

Arbeitspapier

The decision-making process in the ECB's Governing Council remains opaque as the ECB, in contrast to many other central banks, does not publish the votes for or against a policy proposal. In this paper, we construct an index of dissent based on the ECB presidents' answers to journalists' questions during the press conference following each meeting. This narrative account of dissent suggests that dissenting votes are cast frequently. We show that the non-forecastable component of dissent weakens the response of long-term interest rates to policy surprises and thus affects the monetary transmission mechanism. The yield response is significantly stronger under unanimity compared to dissent. This finding is robust to several alternative specifications.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 48-2020

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems ; Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects ; Central Banks and Their Policies
• Thema: event studies ; monetary policy transmission ; monetary policy committee ; disagreement ; term structure

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Tillmann, Peter
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
• (wo): Marburg
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/234853
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ