Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement with or without redistribution

Arbeitspapier

The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paper determines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is, however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1370

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
• Subject: flexible retirement ; asymmetric information ; actuarial fairness (neutrality) ; mechanism design ; Flexible Altersgrenze ; Versicherungstechnik ; Asymmetrische Information ; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion ; Second Best ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Simonovits, András
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18733
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET