Arbeitspapier
Worker Reciprocity and the Returns to Training: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Workers' reciprocal behavior is one argument used to explain why firms invest in employee human capital. We explore the relation between firm-sponsored training and reciprocity by providing evidence that workers reciprocate employer training investments by making greater effort. Using a field experiment with random assignment to a training program, we show that reciprocal workers have significantly higher performance than their non-reciprocal peers after participation in the training course. This result suggests that reciprocal workers exert greater effort in response to the firm's investment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9179
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Personnel Economics: Training
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- Thema
-
firm-sponsored training
reciprocity
field experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Sauermann, Jan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Sauermann, Jan
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2015
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