Arbeitspapier
Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?
Pay What You Want (PWYW) and Name Your Own Price (NYOP) are customer driven pricing mechanisms that give customers (some) pricing power. Both have been used in service industries with high fixed costs to price discriminate without setting a reference price. Their participatory and innovative nature gives rise to promotional benefits that do not accrue to posted-price sellers. We explore the nature and effects of these benefits and compare PWYW and NYOP using controlled lab experiments. We show that PWYW is a very aggressive strategy that achieves almost full market penetration. It can be profitable if there are promotional benefits and if marginal costs are low. In contrast, NYOP can be used profitably also if marginal costs are high and if there are no such benefits. It reduces price competition and segments the market. In a second experiment, we generate promotional benefits endogenously. We show that PWYW monopolizes the follow-up market but fails to be profitable. NYOP is less successful in penetrating the market but yields much higher profits.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 8
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Marketing
- Thema
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Customer-driven pricing mechanisms
pay what you want
name your own price
competitive strategies
marketing
laboratory experiment
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Krämer, Florentin
Schmidt, Klaus M.
Spann, Martin
Stich, Lucas
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (wo)
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München und Berlin
- (wann)
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2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Krämer, Florentin
- Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Spann, Martin
- Stich, Lucas
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Entstanden
- 2017