Arbeitspapier

Time Consistent Matrimony with Endogenous Trust

A simple model of marriage and divorce predicts that no marriages occur. Yet, in real life, people marry all the time in seemingly similar situations. This discordance is explained using psychological game theory. An emotional guilt effect is explicitly modeled and multiple belief-dependent equilibria become possible: some marriages don’t happen, some are formed but end in divorce, some last a lifetime. For certain parameterizations a lifelong efficient marriage is guaranteed; one spouse’s approval to marry signals a trust so strong as to force the other spouse to hold beliefs which make divorce exceedingly emotionally unattractive. These results may have some bearing also on other partnerships than marriage.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1997:1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
Thema
Marriage
time consistency
emotions
guilt
psychological game theory

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dufwenberg, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Uppsala
(wann)
1996

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2377
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dufwenberg, Martin
  • Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1996

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