Arbeitspapier
Time Consistent Matrimony with Endogenous Trust
A simple model of marriage and divorce predicts that no marriages occur. Yet, in real life, people marry all the time in seemingly similar situations. This discordance is explained using psychological game theory. An emotional guilt effect is explicitly modeled and multiple belief-dependent equilibria become possible: some marriages dont happen, some are formed but end in divorce, some last a lifetime. For certain parameterizations a lifelong efficient marriage is guaranteed; one spouses approval to marry signals a trust so strong as to force the other spouse to hold beliefs which make divorce exceedingly emotionally unattractive. These results may have some bearing also on other partnerships than marriage.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 1997:1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
- Thema
-
Marriage
time consistency
emotions
guilt
psychological game theory
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dufwenberg, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Uppsala
- (wann)
-
1996
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2377
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dufwenberg, Martin
- Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1996