Arbeitspapier
Imposing choice on the uninformed: The case of dynamic currency conversion
It is a common experience for present-day consumers making an international payment via credit or debit card to be invited to choose the currency in which they wish to have the transaction executed. While this choice, made feasible by a technology known as dynamic currency conversion (DCC), seems to foster competition, we argue that the opposite is the case. In fact, the unique pure-strategy equilibrium in a natural fee-setting game, with uninformed and possibly inattentive consumers, turns out to be highly asymmetric, entailing fees for the service provider that persistently exceed the monopoly level. Although losses in welfare may be substantial, a regulatory solution is unlikely to come about due to a global free-rider problem.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 345
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
- Thema
-
Dynamic currency conversion
Payment cards
Price competition
Monopoly
Free-rider problem
Rational inattention
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ewerhart, Christian
Li, Sheng
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2023
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-187399
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ewerhart, Christian
- Li, Sheng
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2023