Optimal Environmental Policy Differentials under Emissions Constraints

Arbeitspapier

Is there a case to be made for preferential treatment of the exposed sector in an economy when compliance to an aggregate emissions constraint induced by an international environmental agreement is mandatory? This question is being debated in many countries, including The Netherlands, in the context of the implementation of the Kyoto protocol. We address this issue in a general equilibrium framework in this paper, and theoretically cover several market structures, including perfect competition, oligopoly and the large country case. Our main finding is that in many circumstances preferential treatment is not warranted from the point of view of maximizing social welfare.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 03-080/3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
• Subject: ecological dumping ; general equilibrium ; emissions constraints ; Kyoto protocol ; Umweltstandard ; Umweltpolitik ; Internationale Wirtschaft ; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Florax, Raymond J.G.M. ; Mulatu, Abay ; Withagen, Cees A.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85786
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET