Arbeitspapier
Second-chance offers and buyer reputation: Theory and evidence on auctions with default
Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow "second-chance" offers, where the runner-up bidder pays his own bid price, and they let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces bids; (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default; (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders with a reputation for defaulting, counter to the idea of deterring such behavior. Our auction experiments support these predictions and provide insights on their practical relevance.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 237
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
Auctions
Default
Reputation
Second-Chance Offers
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Engelmann, Dirk
Frank, Jeff
Koch, Alexander K.
Valente, Marieta
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (wo)
-
München und Berlin
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Engelmann, Dirk
- Frank, Jeff
- Koch, Alexander K.
- Valente, Marieta
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Entstanden
- 2020