Arbeitspapier

Second-chance offers and buyer reputation: Theory and evidence on auctions with default

Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow "second-chance" offers, where the runner-up bidder pays his own bid price, and they let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces bids; (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default; (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders with a reputation for defaulting, counter to the idea of deterring such behavior. Our auction experiments support these predictions and provide insights on their practical relevance.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 237

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Auctions
Default
Reputation
Second-Chance Offers

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Engelmann, Dirk
Frank, Jeff
Koch, Alexander K.
Valente, Marieta
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
(wo)
München und Berlin
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Engelmann, Dirk
  • Frank, Jeff
  • Koch, Alexander K.
  • Valente, Marieta
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition

Entstanden

  • 2020

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