Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills

Arbeitspapier

We present field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 14529

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Labor Demand ; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; Labor Contracts ; Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration ; Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
• Thema: skills ; job search ; employment ; wages ; labor markets ; active labor market

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Carranza, Eliana ; Garlick, Robert ; Orkin, Kate ; Rankin, Neil
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/245580
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ