Why do oaths work? Image concerns and credibility in promise keeping

Arbeitspapier

We use a laboratory experiment to understand the channels through which honesty oaths can affect behavior and credibility. Using a game with asymmetric information in a financial market setting that captures some important features of advisor-investor interactions, we manipulate the common knowledge of the promise and investigate three non-pecuniary costs of breaking an oath: co-player image costs, audience-image costs, and self-image costs. For investors oaths are neither sufficient nor necessary to generate trust: ultimately investors rely on their experience. We link laboratory results to a survey we conducted in the Netherlands where oaths are required in the banking sector.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2023-058/I

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
• Thema: Promise-keeping ; Honesty Oaths ; Common Knowledge ; Deniability ; Financial Markets ; Laboratory Experiment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kingsuwankul, Sorravich ; Tergiman, Chloe ; Villeval, Marie-Claire
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2023

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/282871
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ