Arbeitspapier
Self-Enforcing Agreements under Unequal Nationally Determined Contributions
For a large global economy with normal goods, and an unequal world income distribution, we consider the endogenous formation and stability of an international environmental agreement (IEA) under nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Nations share green R&D efforts and enjoy R&D spillovers if they join an IEA. Nonmembers do not enjoy R&D spillovers. We show that the Grand Coalition is stable under NDCs if all nations are active carbon abatement and R&D contributors. If some nations are inactive, because they lack sufficient income to provide carbon abatement and R&D, the stable coalition under NDCs is the coalition of all active (wealthier) nations.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5708
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
Public Goods
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
- Subject
-
international environmental agreements
self-enforcing
nationally determined contributions
R&D sharing
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Silva, Emilson C.D.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2016
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Silva, Emilson C.D.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2016
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