Arbeitspapier
Enforcing peace agreements through commitment technologies
This paper models the instability of peace agreements, motivated by the empirical regularity with which peace agreements tend to break down following civil war. When war provides opportunities for profit to one side, or when other difficulties such as historical grievances exist, peace may become incentive incompatible. The party that has something to gain from surprise warfare may agree to peace, but will later renege on it. It is shown that the levels of conflict chosen by this group are an increasing function of both grievance and greed, but decreasing in the direct costs of war. Peace is achievable via externally devised mechanisms that enhance commitment to peace. Aid and direct military peacekeeping intervention (sanctions) can reduce or eliminate conflict. These sanctions, however, need to be credible. Finally, the independent provision and finance of international sanctions are considered. When these arrangements yield little benefit to financial sponsors, or are very costly to them, the bite of the sanctions can become ineffective.
- ISBN
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978-92-9230-093-7
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: WIDER Research Paper ; No. 2008/45
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Subject
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commitment problems
peace treaties
commitment technologies
sanctions
Friedenssicherung
Verhandlungstheorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Murshed, S. Mansoob
Verwimp, Philip
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
- (where)
-
Helsinki
- (when)
-
2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Murshed, S. Mansoob
- Verwimp, Philip
- The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
Time of origin
- 2008
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Compliance Technology and Self-Enforcing Agreements
Trade tariffs and self-enforcing environmental agreements
Self-enforcing agreements in international fisheries management
Self-enforcing voluntary agreements and environmental reputation
Self-enforcing environmental agreements and international trade
Self-enforcing environmental agreements and capital mobility
Self-enforcing environmental agreements and international trade
Trade Tariffs and Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements
Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Altruistic Preferences