Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing

Arbeitspapier

We examine the interaction between vote-share contracts and learning-by-doing. Candidates for a political office are allowed to offer vote-share thresholds. The elected politician has to achieve at least this threshold value in his reelection result to remain in office for a second term. We assume there are learningby- doing effects for incumbents and show that competition leads to vote-share contracts implementing the socially optimal threshold, which is above one-half. Vote-share contracts improve the average ability level of a reelected politician and increase effort in the first term of an incumbent. On the other hand, vote-share contracts reduce the probability that learning-by-doing takes place. However, the overall effect of vote-share contracts is welfare-enhancing, even under the assumption of learning-by-doing.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 09/114

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: elections ; political contracts ; vote-share thresholds ; learning-by-doing effects ; incumbency advantage ; Wahl ; Learning by Doing ; Asymmetrische Information ; Neue politische Ökonomie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Müller, Markus
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2009

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005859372
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171557
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET