Artikel
Consultative democracy and trust
We report experimental results from three Colombian villages concerning the impact of a voting mechanism on interpersonal trust and trustworthiness. The vote is purely consultative in that participants are asked to declare in a secret ballot the most “appropriate” plan of action for individuals involved in a “Trust Game”. The plan of action that is most voted is then publicly announced. The mechanism is unbinding, as only the aggregate result of the voting is disclosed and it has no bearing on individual decisions. In spite of the strategic irrelevance of the announcement, we observe an increase in both trust and trustworthiness after the announcement is carried out, in comparison to the baseline condition where no voting takes place.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Structural Change and Economic Dynamics ; ISSN: 0954-349X ; Volume: 44 ; Year: 2018 ; Pages: 55-67 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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experiments
trust
voting
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Bogliacino, Francesco
Jiménez Lozano, Laura
Grimalda, Gianluca
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Elsevier
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
- (where)
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Amsterdam
- (when)
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2018
- DOI
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doi:10.1016/j.strueco.2017.10.004
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Bogliacino, Francesco
- Jiménez Lozano, Laura
- Grimalda, Gianluca
- Elsevier
- ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Time of origin
- 2018