Artikel

Consultative democracy and trust

We report experimental results from three Colombian villages concerning the impact of a voting mechanism on interpersonal trust and trustworthiness. The vote is purely consultative in that participants are asked to declare in a secret ballot the most “appropriate” plan of action for individuals involved in a “Trust Game”. The plan of action that is most voted is then publicly announced. The mechanism is unbinding, as only the aggregate result of the voting is disclosed and it has no bearing on individual decisions. In spite of the strategic irrelevance of the announcement, we observe an increase in both trust and trustworthiness after the announcement is carried out, in comparison to the baseline condition where no voting takes place.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Structural Change and Economic Dynamics ; ISSN: 0954-349X ; Volume: 44 ; Year: 2018 ; Pages: 55-67 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
experiments
trust
voting

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bogliacino, Francesco
Jiménez Lozano, Laura
Grimalda, Gianluca
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Elsevier
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
(where)
Amsterdam
(when)
2018

DOI
doi:10.1016/j.strueco.2017.10.004
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Bogliacino, Francesco
  • Jiménez Lozano, Laura
  • Grimalda, Gianluca
  • Elsevier
  • ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Time of origin

  • 2018

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