Learning from unrealized versus realized prices

Arbeitspapier

Our market experiment investigates the extent to which traders learn from the price, differentiating between situations where orders are submitted before versus after the price has realized. When market participants have to submit their bids conditional on the price, they show a bias by reacting only to their private information and not to the hypothetical value of the price. In a sequential trading mechanism, where the price is known at the bid submission, bids react to price to an extent that is roughly consistent with the benchmark theory.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1487

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Thema: Naive Expectations ; Asymmetric Information ; Rational Expectations ; Sequential Markets

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Ngangoue, Kathleen ; Weizsäcker, Georg
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110964
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ