Arbeitspapier

What money can't buy: allocations with priority lists, lotteries and queues

I study the welfare optimal allocation of a number of identical and indivisible objects to a set of heterogeneous risk-neutral agents under the hypothesis that money is not available. Agents have independent private values, which represent the maximum time that they are willing to wait in line to obtain a good. A priority list, which ranks agents according to their expected values, is optimal when hazard rates of the distributions of values are increasing. Queues, which allocates the object to those who wait in line the longest, are optimal in a symmetric setting with decreasing hazard rates.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1482

Classification
Wirtschaft
Rationing; Licensing
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Publicly Provided Private Goods
Subject
rationing
queues
priority lists
lotteries

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Condorelli, Daniele
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(where)
Evanston, IL
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Condorelli, Daniele
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Time of origin

  • 2009

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