Arbeitspapier

Government guarantees and financial stability

Banks are intrinsically fragile because of their role as liquidity providers. This results in under-provision of liquidity. We analyze the effect of government guarantees on the interconnection between banks' liquidity creation and likelihood of runs in a model of global games, where banks.and depositors' behavior are endogenous and affected by the amount and form of guarantee. The main insight of our analysis is that guarantees are welfare improving because they induce banks to improve liquidity provision although in a way that sometimes increases the likelihood of runs or creates distortions in banks' behavior.

ISBN
978-92-899-2754-3
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 2032

Classification
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Subject
panic runs
fundamental runs
government guarantees
bank moral hazard

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Allen, Franklin
Carletti, Elena
Goldstein, Itay
Leonello, Agnese
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2017

DOI
doi:10.2866/46276
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Allen, Franklin
  • Carletti, Elena
  • Goldstein, Itay
  • Leonello, Agnese
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Time of origin

  • 2017

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