Arbeitspapier
Team structure and the effectiveness of collective performance pay
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers; No. 6747
Bezug (was)
Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
incentives
teams performance
sub-teams
cooperation
Besoldung
Leistungsentgelt
Arbeitsgruppe
Kooperation
Arbeitsleistung
Großbritannien
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
incentives
teams performance
sub-teams
cooperation
Besoldung
Leistungsentgelt
Arbeitsgruppe
Kooperation
Arbeitsleistung
Großbritannien
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
Ratto, Marisa
Tominey, Emma
Vergé, Thibaud
Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Tominey, Emma
Vergé, Thibaud
Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Erschienen
Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- Rechteinformation
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
18.10.2021, 08:58 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ratto, Marisa
- Tominey, Emma
- Vergé, Thibaud
- Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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