Artikel
Incentivizing efficient utilization without reducing access: The case against cost‐sharing in insurance
Cost-sharing is regarded as an important tool to reduce moral hazard in health insurance. Contrary to standard prediction, however, such requirements are found to decrease utilization both of efficient and of inefficient care. I employ a simple model that incorporates two possible explanations—consumer mistakes and limited access—to assess the welfare implications of different insurance designs. I find cost-sharing never to be an optimal solution as it produces two novel inefficiencies by limiting access. An alternative design, relying on bonuses, has no such side effects and achieves the same incentivization. I show how the optimal design can be deduced empirically and discuss possible impediments to its implementation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Health Economics ; ISSN: 1099-1050 ; Volume: 29 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 7 ; Pages: 827-840 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
cost‐sharing
insurance rebates
limited access
moral hazard
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fels, Markus
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wiley
- (wo)
-
Hoboken, NJ
- (wann)
-
2020
- DOI
-
doi:10.1002/hec.4023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Fels, Markus
- Wiley
Entstanden
- 2020
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