Social choice among complex objects

Arbeitspapier

We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority has the power of determine the social outcome. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which a social outcome may be a local or global optimum for a set of objects, and we show that, by appropriately redefining the set of objects, intransitive cycles may be broken and the median voter may be turned into a loser.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: LEM Working Paper Series ; No. 2010/02

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Thema: social choice ; object construction power ; agenda power ; intransitive cycles ; median voter

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Marengo, Luigi ; Settepanella, Simona
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM)
• (wo): Pisa
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89405
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ