Financing Student Migration: Evidence for a Commitment Problem

Arbeitspapier

This paper develops and tests a model of profit-sharing arrangement over returns to a student migration investment. Taking advantage of a unique dataset on Cameroonian students, I find evidence of non-commitment bargaining between student, parents and an outside helper. The commitment problem arises because the coalition of parents and student has strong incentives not to abide by the outcome of the ex ante negotiation with the helper. This finding suggests some inefficiency of the decision process, in that students from credit-constrained families might not benefit from the support of a helper, even though the returns to their migration can be significant.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ifo Working Paper ; No. 187

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Education and Economic Development ; Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
• Subject: Student migration ; bargaining ; commitment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Méango, Romuald
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108754
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET