Arbeitspapier

One reason countries pay their debts: Renegotiation and international trade

This paper estimates the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereign default may be associated with a subsequent decline in international trade either because creditors want to deter default by debtors, or because trade finance dries up after default. To estimate the effect, I use an empirical gravity model of bilateral trade and a large panel data set covering fifty years and more than 200 trading partners. The model controls for a host of factors that influence bilateral trade flows, including the incidence of International Monetary Fund programs. Using the dates of sovereign debt renegotiations conducted through the Paris Club as a proxy measure for sovereign default, I find that renegotiation is associated with an economically and statistically significant decline in bilateral trade between a debtor and its creditors. The decline in bilateral trade is approximately 8 percent a year and persists for about fifteen years.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Staff Report ; No. 142

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Trade: General
International Lending and Debt Problems
Thema
empirical, sovereign, default, bilateral, panel, gravity, Paris Club, rescheduling
Umschuldung
Außenwirtschaft
Insolvenz
Gravitationsmodell
Schätzung
Welt

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Rose, Andrew K.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Rose, Andrew K.
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Entstanden

  • 2001

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