Arbeitspapier

Talking behind your back: Asymmetric communication in a three-person dilemma

Communication has been regarded as one of the most effective devices in promoting team cooperation. But asymmetric communication sometimes breeds collusion and is detrimental to team efficiency. Here, we present experimental evidence showing that excluding one member from team communication hurts team cooperation: the communicating partners collude in profit allocation against the excluded team member, and the latter reacts by refraining from exerting effort. We further show that allowing the partners to reach out to the excluded member helps to restore cooperation and fairness in profit allocation. But it does not stop the partners from talking behind the other member. They sometimes game the system by tricking the excluded member to contribute but then grabbing all profits for themselves.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2018-11

Classification
Wirtschaft
Externalities
Public Goods
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other
Design of Experiments: General
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Subject
communication
fairness
collusion
allocation
team cooperation
laboratory experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Abbink, Klaus
Dong, Lu
Huang, Lingbo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
(where)
Nottingham
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Abbink, Klaus
  • Dong, Lu
  • Huang, Lingbo
  • The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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